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This paper aims to assess the extent to which social policies address chronic poverty in south 
European Union countries and particularly in Portugal. The Southern European welfare 
regime (Leibfried, 1993; Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997; Matsaganis et al, 2003), which includes 
Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, has been seen as less developed and less generous in 
covering social risks. Despite different country profiles, in what Portugal present some 
distinctive features, South European countries also exhibit several target inefficiencies that 
make social policies much less successful in tackling extreme and chronic poverty. Possible 
explanations of that fact may rest in institutional factors, such as the central role of family and 
the less accountability of the state, the high tolerance of inequality and poverty, and, in 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Poverty, in their multiple dimensions, has been progressively acknowledged by policy-
makers, and in several instances of national and international governance. A t a global level, 
United Nations have launched the Human Development Reports in the beginnings of the 
1990s, which paved the way for a renewed and broader understanding of poverty and 
development. More recently, the Millennium Development Goals tried to achieve a new 
international commitment with development goals in the beginning of the new millennium. 
In the more developed countries, poverty and social exclusion still defies the true meaning of 
a balanced and sustainable development. In European Union, tackling poverty and social 
exclusion continues to be an enormous challenge, since near 57 million individuals were still 
at risk of monetary relative poverty in 2001 in the ‘old European Union countries’ (EU 15) 
and many more are expected to be vulnerable to poverty and social exclusion in the new and 
acceding countries. Persistent levels of cross-section poverty and chronic poverty in EU 15, 
higher levels of inequality and poverty within an enlarged European Union (EU 25), coupled 
with the emergence of new  social risks (Taylor-Gooby, 2004b) associated with demographic 
(increased ethnic, culture and religious diversity, ageing, etc.), labour market (changing 
patterns of job creation/destruction due to knowledge-based society and globalization) and 
family (increased diversity of family types, changing of family roles) changes are expected to 
redefine the scope of social cohesion, and social policy, in Europe. 
As Barrientos  et al (2004) suggest there are some empirical links between social protection 
and chronic poverty in developed countries that would be of some worth to explore. 
Furthermore, if tackling chronic poverty will be more effective through strong and sustained 
social protection systems (idem: 20), the legitimacy foundations of social policy and its f ocus 
on the most needed will also be of paramount importance in this respect. Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain, the southern European countries clustered in the ‘Southern or 
Mediterranean regime of welfare’ will provide an interesting case study. The public welfare 
systems in these countries are relatively new, comparing to theirs EU 15 partners, their 
economic development level is lower and they are facing simultaneously the ‘old social risks’ 
as well as the ‘new social risks’ that are increasingly becoming global. Within the southern 
Europe cluster, we will use Portugal in some illustrative references, both because of its   3
singularities and for reasons of better acquaintance with recent research on the topic under 
analysis.  
2. EUROPEAN WELFARE REGIMES AND CHRONIC POVERTY 
The fight against poverty and social exclusion has received a new emphasis since the adoption 
of the ‘Lisbon strategy’ (European Council, March 2000), which stressed the importance of 
“modernizing the European social model, investing in people and combating social exclusion” 
(EC, 2000). In the preparation of Lisbon European Council, Ferrera et al (2000) sustained the 
need of recasting the European social model, with the compatibilisation of the tradition of 
social solidarity with new policies, which favoured labour market flexibility and inclusion and 
addressed new social risks. 
The Lisbon European Council also adopted the principle of open co-ordination within the area 
of social exclusion, following the framework of European employment strategy, which 
includes: the definition of common objectives and common indicators to monitor progress, 
National Plans, a Community Action Plan, as well as Joint Reports on social inclusion and 
regular monitoring and evaluation. Despite the recognition of being a policy area in its own 
right and the new policy instruments developed, the field of social inclusion is still a 
problematic one with very different national strategies’, lose co-ordination between states and 
poor articulation with other policy objectives. Moreover, the transformation process of 
European societies and even of European Union frontiers, are likely to add more complexity 
to the reshaping of the European social model.   
Within European Union, the southern countries of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain have 
been clustered in a welfare model or regime, the ‘Southern” or “Mediterranean’ regime 
(Ferrera, 1996; Trifiletti, 1999;  Bonoli,  1997; Matsaganis et al, 2003), although some authors 
are prone to consider European southern countries as part  or variant of the ‘Continental’ 
regime ( Esping-Andersen, 1999;  Adao e Silva, 2000; Powell and Barrientos, 2004), 
frequently characterized by a ‘rudimentary’ development of its social protection (Gough, 
1996).  
Welfare regimes in European Union have to be c onsidered in the process of their evolution, 
which certainly is leading to a certain degree of convergence
1, but is also preserving certain 
specificities. Southern European countries, as we shall refer later in more detail, share some 
common features, not  only in the indicators of social protection, but more broadly in the 
                                                 
1 Sometimes described as a blurring of regime demarcations and a pervasive mixing of welfare pillars.    4
interplay of state institutions’ ‘softness’ and the strong presence of family in the welfare mix 
(Matsaganis et al, 2003; Trifiletti, 1999), as well as in social perceptions and attitudes towards 
welfare (Gallie and Paugam, 2002; van Oorschot, 2003). 
We will begin by assessing some information about social protection, inequality and poverty 
in the set of the four countries in comparison with EU 15. For this, Table 1 presents some 
selected social indicators for the EU 15 and the southern European countries in 2001.  
Per capita GDP in the southern European countries varies between 67.3% and 100%, and 
social expenditure between 56.9% and 96.6% of EU 15 average. Portugal presents the lower 
scores in these indicators, but it is worth mentioning the fast growth of social expenditures in 
the last decade, corresponding to the expansion of social protection and the development of 
new areas of policy.  
Standard measures of income inequality (Gini coefficient and the quintile ratio S80/S20) and 
of poverty (poverty incidence and poverty intensity) have been computed for all eight waves 
of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) covering the period 1994 to 2001. 
Eurostat adopts the ‘modified’ OCDE s cale to equivalise incomes, and defines the poverty 
threshold at 60% of the national median equivalised income in each year. With notorious 
political caution, poverty incidence is denominated poverty risk. Persistent poverty risk is 
defined by Eurostat as a situation of poverty risk in the present year and at least in other two 
out of the latest three years. 
Although in Table 1 we have only inequality and poverty measures from the last year of the 
ECHP, those measures (and country rankings) are relatively s table over the full range of the 
panel. Inequality and poverty measures are higher in the south of EU 15 and, more important, 
social transfers efficiency is considerable lower, particularly in the case of social transfers 
other than pensions. This point will deserve further attention in the next section. 
   5
Table 1 Selected Social Indicators, 2001
EU 15 Greece  Italy Portugal  Spain
GDP per capita 
    PPS 
a 23,200 15,500 24,400 17,100 19,200
    Index (UE 15=100, in PPS) 
a
100 66.8 105.2 73.7 82.8
    Real annual growth rate 1995-2001
b
2.2 3.1 1.7 3.1 3.2
Social Expenditure per capita 
c
    Euros (PPS) 6,405 3,971 6,186 3,644 3,867
    Index (UE 15=100) 100 62.0 96.6 56.9 60.4
    annual growth rate 1992-2001 1.9 5.6 1.3 6.3 1.7
Social Expenditure as % of GDP 
c 27.5 27.2 20.1 23.9 25.6
Inequality measures d
    Gini 28 33 29 37 33
    S80/S20 4.4 5.7 4.8 6.5 5.5
Poverty measures 
d
Poverty Line per "adult equivalent" 
    PPS 8,253 5,443 7,044 4,967 6,527
    Index (UE 15=100, in PPS) 100 66.0 85.4 60.2 79.1
Poverty risk after social transfers 15 20 20 20 19
Relative income gap 22 28 28 22 24
Poverty risk before social transfers 39 39 42 37 37
Poverty risk after pensions 24 23 22 24 23
Other social transfers efficiency  37.5 13.0 9.1 16.7 17.4
Total social transfers efficiency  61.5 48.7 52.4 45.9 48.6
Persistent poverty risk  9 14 13 15 10
Persistent poverty as % of current poverty  60.0 70.0 65.0 75.0 52.6
Source: 
a
 EC (2003) 
             
b
 Eurostat on line Structural Indicators 
             
c
 Abramovici (2004)
             
d 
Dennis and Guio (2004)  
 
 
Tacking together poverty incidence and intensity produce a clear cut between the 
performances of social democratic and conservative regimes on the one hand, and liberal and 




                                                 
2 Kuchler and Goebel (2003), using a different approach (smoothed income) and a different threshold (50% of 
the mean income) to measure poverty in ECHP 1994-1997, present similar results on incidence, intensity (and 
also in severity) FGT indices. Furthermore, TIP curves shapes reflect the worse situation of all Mediterranean 
countries and specially Portugal.   6
Figure 1  Incidence and Intensity of Poverty Risk, 2001







































Persistent poverty risk in southern European countries is also higher than EU 15 average, as is 
the percentage of persistent poor in the poor population (exception for Spain in this last 
indicator)
3. Barrientos  et al (2004) suggested that some empirical relation between long term 
spending on social protection and chronic poverty in European countries exists and can be 
related with the stability and effectiveness of social protection. In fact, taking advantage of 
harmonized information of Eurostat statistics, the plot of mean persistent poverty risk over the 
eight waves of ECHP and mean expenditure in social protection as percentage of GDP in the 
period 1990-2001 reveals a negative association, with the southern countries clustering in the 
far right of the graph. Substituting expenditure in social protection for efficiency of social 
expenditure, the figure stresses even more clearly the position of the southern countries
4. 
 
                                                 
3 If we take the full range of ECHP (1994-2001), the average ratio of persistent poverty to contemporary poverty 
will be 57.8% for EU15, 63.3% for Greece, 60.5% for Italy, 67.7% for Portugal and 57.7% for Spain.  
4 Pearson correlation coefficient between persistent poverty and social expenditure effort is –0.7949 and 
 between persistent poverty and social expenditure efficiency is –0.8587.   7
Figure 2  Social Protection and Persistent Poverty
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Figure 3  Social Protection Efficiency and Persistent Poverty
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3. WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE SOUTHERN REGIME? 
In the four countries of southern Europe, the levels of social protection, approached by the 
expenditure on social protection as percentage of GDP, are in fact lower than their 
counterparts, but the social expenditure shows also much less efficiency in reducing poverty 
levels. What are the causes for such efficiency flaw and what explains that apparent social 
protection leakage in relative poor countries with relatively more recent social policies?    
The degree of redistribution in a society is determined by both the social protection system 
and the taxation system. Regrettably, ECHP collects data net of taxes; therefore, the 
redistributive effect of the tax system cannot be scrutinized by microanalysis o f personal and 
families’ incomes and taxes
5.  
Data related to taxes in the southern countries are difficult to estimate. However, several 
studies have highlighted the weight of the shadow economy, the size of tax evasion and fraud, 
and the relative tax burden on salaried workers and middle classes.  
The estimated size of shadow economy in 2001 ranges from 22,5% in Portugal and Spain to 
27% in Italy and 28,5% in Greece, which correspond to the highest values in EU 15 
(Dell’Amo and Schneider, forthcoming). Despite some measures to fight tax evasion and 
improve tax collection, public opinion and policy decision makers don’t show strong 
commitment to higher social justice based on tax justice and progressivity. As Schneider and 
Ende (2000) point out, the shadow  economy may be seen as an indicator of lack of legitimacy 
of the social order and existing rules, which are indeed widely defied in the south of Europe. 
Probably this is strongly related to engrained attitudes towards wealth and inequality, and a 
certain way of framing relationships with institutions and social networks. 
Recent harmonized data on tax systems of the EU 15 (Eurostat, 2004) revealed that tax 
structures of Greece and Portugal rely heavily in indirect taxation, which introduces relative 
regressivity in their tax systems. Italy’s tax structure has a relatively higher weight in direct 
taxes, whereas in Spain the same occurs with social contributions. 
The redistributive effect of social transfers in EU 15, using ECHP in a comparative 
perspective, has been object of analysis in several studies (Eurostat 2003b; Ras et al 2003; 
                                                 
5 Ras et al (2003), using LIS data from Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, The Netherlands, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom in the first half of the 1990s, concluded that the distributive effect of social benefits is much 
bigger than that of income taxes and social security contributions (op cit: 20).   9
Marlier and Cohen-Solal, 2000)
6. Relying on those studies, one can better understand the 
pattern of inefficiency of social protection expenditure in tackling both current poverty and 
chronic poverty in south European countries. Recent investigations on the effects of social 
benefits in poverty dynamics and persistent poverty in Portugal (Nunes, 2003; Rodrigues, 
2004; Ferreira, forthcoming) also provide some additional insights into the question under 
study. 
Social benefits are widespread in EU 15: in 1997, it was estimated that 73% of the persons 
were living in households receiving social transfers, 52% receiving non-pensions transfers 
and 31% pensions. These percentages vary quite significantly between the EU 15 countries 
and, in this respect, southern countries do not rank together: if Greece and Italy, followed by 
Spain, present values far bellow European average in non-pensions transfers beneficiaries, 
Portugal exhibits one of t he highest percentages; in relation to pensions beneficiaries, all four 
southern countries score above European average, and Italy even presents the highest value in 




Relating beneficiaries’ percentages and the importance of social transfers in their disposable 
income can shad new light into the question of relative inefficiency of the social protection 
system. Public pensions, which perform a replacement function, constitute the main 
                                                 
6 All the studies exclude any type of in-kind transfers, such as public education or health. The differences 
between European countries in size and distribution of such transfers would be an interesting research subject. 
Table 2  Social Benefits and Beneficiaries, 1997
EU 15 Greece  Italy Portugal  Spain
% of social beneficiaries in total population
    Pensions 31 36 40 36 33
    Others 52 20 19 68 34
    Total 73 49 51 88 58
Structure of social benefits 
    Pensions 61 88 84 68 63
    Others 39 12 16 32 38
Social benefits as % of disposable income
    Total income 33 25 32 28 32
    Recipients income 45 51 61 32 55
Others social benefits as % of disposable income
    Total income 13 3 5 9 12
    Recipients income 25 15 23 13 34
Source: Eurostat (2003b)  10
component of total social transfers, accounting for 61% of the amount of all transfers in the 
EU 15. Spain and Portugal present values slightly above average, while Italy and Greece 
highly concentrate their social benefits in this function. Conversely, other social transfers 
more closely related to u niversal rights or means- targeted support weight bellow average in 
all southern countries. 
Marlier and Cohen-Solal (2000), based on the 1996 wave of the ECHP, present similar 
results. They also analyze benefits other than pensions’ coverage and amounts by quintiles of 
population total income before social benefits other than pensions. 
In southern Europe, as in all other UE 15 countries, social benefits other than pensions fall as 
income rises, as both the relative number of social beneficiaries and the weight of these 
benefits in total income decreases. However, if we look at the benefits share going to each 
quintile, the pattern is not so sharp and, particularly in the case of Portugal, benefits spread in 
significant amount into top incomes. 
 
 
Table 3  Social Benefits Other than Pensions and Beneficiaries, 
              by quintile of total income, 1996
EU 13 Greece  Italy Portugal  Spain
Quintile 1
    % of beneficiaries  73 31 31 69 68
    Social benefits as % of income 48 11 19 30 48
    Benefit share 50 37 44 38 54
Quintile 2
    % of beneficiaries  58 22 22 67 38
    Social benefits as % of income 13 5 5 10 11
    Benefit share 21 28 21 22 18
Quintile 3
    % of beneficiaries  51 18 17 72 26
    Social benefits as % of income 6 2 3 2 5
    Benefit share 13 17 16 16 11
Quintile 4
    % of beneficiaries  45 14 12 67 23
    Social benefits as % of income 4 1 2 3 4
    Benefit share 10 10 13 14 11
Quintile 5
    % of beneficiaries  33 9 7 66 11
    Social benefits as % of income 1 0 1 1 1
    Benefit share 7 8 7 11 6
Source: Marlier and Cohen-Solal (2000)
Note: EU 13 is EU 15 except Finland and Sweden  11
The restriction of the analysis to working age population (Eurostat, 2003b), permit to qualify 
further the efficiency pattern of social benefits other than pensions in reducing poverty risk 
and poverty gap. 
 
 
As we have seen in Table 1, and it is again present in the first panel of Table 4, social 
transfers other than pensions have a very limited impact on poverty reduction in southern 
countries.  
The magnitude of redistributed income and the degree of its progressivity are the determinant 
factors explaining southern relative inefficiency, and the latter plays an important and yet less 
perceived role. As much as low level of income redistributed (by low level of benefits and/or 
low number of beneficiaries) deficient targeting of benefits have a serious contribution to 
southern social protection inefficiency. 
On the final panel of Table 4, the impact of social transfers in reducing long-term poverty 
risk
7 is assessed. In this respect, Spain and Italy have profiles similar to UE 13 whereas 
Greece and specially Portugal exhibit a very poor performance. 
In southern Europe welfare’s distinctive nature is not so much linked with rudimentary social 
schemes such as pension, but rather to several imbalances and institutional deficiencies which 
result in inequities and inefficiencies (Guillen and Matsaganis, 2000; Matsaganis et al, 2004). 
After all, pensions in the south are acting well in terms of social protection against poverty, 
performing as well as EU 15 average (as we can see in Table 1). Other social benefits 
                                                 
7 Here long-term poverty stands for poverty over 3 or 4 years of the total 4 years of the data analyzed. 
Table 4  Social Benefits and Poverty and Long-Term Poverty, 1997
EU 15 Greece  Italy Portugal  Spain
Non-pensions benefits (work. age population)
   Poverty risk before transfers  23 20 20 23 27
   Poverty risk after transfers 14 19 18 17 18
   Poverty gap before transfers  50 39 43 41 48
   Poverty gap after transfers  34 35 40 32 38
   Efficiency in poverty risk reduction 39 5 10 26 33
   Efficiency in poverty gap reduction 32 10 7 22 21
Total social transfers  
   Long-term poverty risk before transfers  35 32 34 32 38
   Long-term poverty risk after transfers 12 16 12 19 14
   Efficiency in long-term poverty reduction 66 50 65 41 63
Source: Eurostat (2003b)  12
accruing to w orking age population (Table 4) have an important role in Portugal and Spain, 
and a marginal role in Greece and Italy. Probably this reflects the sharp distinction between 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in countries where shadow economy, self-employment and irregular 
contributions careers have still an important social dimension. 
Certainly every modern system of social protection is a complex network of different kinds of 
benefits with different objectives. Classical benefits related to work status and usually 
conformed  within a contributory subsystem perform mainly an earnings replacement 
objective and produce horizontal redistribution (i.e., redistribution between persons belonging 
to different social groups). Social assistance benefits, or family and disability benefits 
positively discriminating within income groups, compensate for differential costs and have a 
distinctive vertical redistribution (i.e., redistribution between persons with different income 
levels) or mixed nature. 
Social benefits other than pensions are much more limited in scope and present clearly less 
effectiveness in the south European countries, both by its size and targeting. In this respect 
Spain and Portugal offer very distinctive profiles, the former with high concentration and the 
latter with high dispersion of benefits.  
Targeting inefficiencies in bricked in social policies,  such  as  a ‘clientelist’ m odel of social 
policy-making, is  a reasonable cause for insufficient protection against certain social risks and 
a significant leakage of social benefits from the most needed. These characteristics coexist, 
however, with a strong public support for redistribution and state support of the most needed, 
which may be seen as a political paradox. 
In fact, in what concerns social perceptions and  social attitudes towards poverty and 
inequality, southern countries also share some common position in the set of UE 15 countries. 
According to 1999/2000 wave of European Values Study and Eurobarometer survey of 2002, 
people in the south of Europe perceive inequality and poverty in their countries to be high 
(van Oorschot, 2003; Gallie and Paugam, 2002), and poverty is perceived as mainly an 
inherited condition (53% in Portugal and Greece, and 46% in Italy and Spain). Working with 
Portugal and Spain as representatives of the southern regime, Taylor-Gooby (2004a) also 
relates a strong perception of an unequal society in opposition with more equalitarian 
aspirations and a clear enthusiasm (shared with eastern ex-socialist countries) for welfare state 
values.    13
Nevertheless, van Oorschot (2003) makes important distinctions between welfare regimes in 
what concerns social capital. Defining the latter as a threefold entity made of trust in other 
people, trust in institutions and participation in civil society, van Oorschot (2003) places south 
European regimes at the bottom of the social capital scale. Relating standardized social capital 
score and the extent of formal welfare provision (measured by the expenditure on social 
protection as percentage of GDP), emerges a clear picture of positive association that supports 
the author’s hypothesis of a ‘communicating vessels mechanism’ by which the increase of 
formal solidarity allows the increase of informal solidarity and social capital. Accepting this 
hypothesis will contradict the idea of a strong welfare-society in southern Europe countries 
(Wall et al, 2001). 
In discussing the possible explanation for such an association, van Oorschot does not exclude 
the play of cultural factors, namely “the more family-centered culture of the Latin countries, 
and the more individualized, and therefore socially more open countries of the north” 
(2003:11). Opielka (2003) also points out ‘familialism’ as a distinctive feature of constitutive 
rules of human relations in Southern Europe, a nd identifies the Catholicism as the ideological 
configuration that ultimately organizes social welfare values in those societies. The role of 
religion in the cultural foundations of welfare values and social policy practices, as well in the 
structuring of a regime theory, is a field where there are few research results and that certainly 
deserves further research effort. 
A closer look to the Portuguese case could give us further insights into the questions above 
raised, namely of social protection failures in tackling high levels of poverty and chronic 
poverty and the meaning and implications of family culture in Southern Europe. Remember 
that Portugal has been identified, in every statistics and studies surveyed, as the country in the 
EU 15 with higher levels of poverty and chronic poverty incidence
8, as well as one presenting 
poor social protection efficiency in reducing poverty. 
Portuguese public social protection system is organized in three main subsystems by the 
framework law of social security of 2002: insurance, solidarity and family protection 
subsystems. The first subsystem is an occupation-related system based on the principle of 
contributory; the second is an non-contributory scheme that aims to prevent poverty and 
social exclusion by guaranteeing benefits in need situations not (or inadequately) covered by 
                                                 
8 These results are very robust to different research options such as equivalence scales and poverty thresholds as 
well as observation windows in ECHP (see for instance Dennis and Guio, 2004; Eurostat, 2003a and b; Kuchler 
and Goebel, 2003; Whelan et al, 2003: Ferreira, 2002).   14
the insurance subsystem; and the third covers family, dependence and handicap charges, 
within a principle of positive discrimination that modules benefits according to earnings and 
other social  contingencies. In this framework, different social benefits sometimes combine 
different redistributive functions operating, in each year, horizontal, vertical or mixed 
redistribution. 
In a recent paper, Nunes (2003) assessed the effect of social benefits i n poverty dynamics in 
Portugal over the period 1994-1998 using ECHP data. The  analysis adopted the standard 
Eurostat definitions on equivalence scales and poverty threshold, and distinguishes social 
benefits of different types.  
The work follows Kuchler and Goebel (2003) in the combination of traditional approaches to 
poverty analysis in panel data, the ‘number of times poor’ approach (NIP) and the ‘smoothed 
income poverty’ approach (SIP), to derive a more homogeneous system of subpopulations of 
people in p overty: the persistent, the intermittent and the transitory poor. Persistent poor are 
those whose incomes are below the poverty line in every year of the panel; intermittent poor 
have smoothed income below the poverty line but experience non-poverty years; transitory 
poor have experience also poverty and non-poverty years but their smoothed income is above 
the poverty line. For the first two groups, classified as chronic poor by the SIP a pproach, 
poverty experiences have a stronger impact in their long-term incomes’ than for the last 
group. 
Table 5 presents the estimated effect of social benefits in poverty reduction in the above 
defined subgroups of poor, as well as in total longitudinal poverty in the years 1994 to 1998, 
differentiating the types of benefits used in ECHP. 
 
 
Table 5  Social Benefits Effectiveness in Reducing Long-Term Poverty Incidence, 1994 - 1998
Poverty
Incidence Total  Solidarity Pensions Unemploym Family Sick/Disable
Persistent 8.8 58.7 3.3 49.1 4.3 9.3 12.9
Intermitent 10.5 28.1 -1.0 19.8 7.1 2.8 6.2
Transitory 19.4 4.0 3.0 2.5 7.2 2.0 7.2
Ever poor  38.8 30.8 1.8 22.9 6.3 3.7 8.1
Source: Nunes (2003)
Reduction in poverty incidence due to social benefits  15
As in other studies reviewed, persistent poverty and chronic poverty assumes high proportion 
of total poverty (22,8% and 49,8%, respectively) and social benefits impact in poverty 
reduction is mainly attributed to pensions. As a whole,  social benefits contribute to reduce 
persistent poverty by near 60% and intermittent poverty by near 30%. The estimated effect on 
transitory poverty should be interpreted with caution, since this subgroup is specially affected 
by the turnover originated by the other poverty subgroups. The overall effect of social 
benefits on ever poverty (i. e., the proportion of people in the panel that were at least one year 
in poverty) amount to near 30%. 
It is remarkable the low level of effectiveness of the benefits less related with income 
replacement from work and more related to the solidarity and positive discrimination 
principles, namely solidarity and family benefits
9. This signals serious drawbacks in welfare 
targeting of benefits aimed to prevent poverty and social exclusion. Nunes (2003) also refers 
the probability of low take-up rates on several programmes targeted on need population 
groups as one of the reasons of such pattern. 
The effect in poverty intensity adds more information on the impact of social transfers in 
poverty experiences. Table 6 presents the estimated effect of total social benefits and 
solidarity and family benefits in poverty gap reduction for the same subgroups of poor. 
 
Once again it is remarkably low the level of effectiveness of these benefits in poverty gap 
reduction. It is worth mention that, in this case, the largest reduction is occurring in the 
transitorily poor, for total social benefits as well as for the individual and consolidated 
benefits more related to solidarity and positive discrimination.  
                                                 
9 Their combined effect would lead to poverty reduction of 12%, 3.4%, 4% and 5.6% in the different poverty 
subgroups, respectively. 
Table 6  Social Benefits Effectiveness in Reducing 
              Long-Term Poverty Gap, 1998
Total  Solidarity Family Sol. + Family
Persistent 51.4 2.9 4.3 7.0
Intermitent 58.4 5.4 6.7 11.5
Transitory 72.3 8.3 12.5 19.7
Ever poor  71 5.0 8.1 12.7
Source: Nunes (2003)
Reduction in poverty gap due to social benefits  16
Ferreira (2002) studied inequality and poverty in Portugal over the period 1994-1997 using 
ECHP data
10 and derived population decompositions of incidence, intensity, severity and 
prevalence of poverty. The population subgroups more affected by persistent poverty are 
much the same the ones with higher levels of classic static measures of poverty: the elderly, 
monoparental families, families with many children and numerous families. In the persistent 
poor population, parents with adolescents are also over-represented.   
There as been established a strong a strong association between persistent poverty and 
persistent deprivation profiles in EU countries (Whelan et al, 2003) and it is recognized that 
the depth and time span of poverty experiences bear hard consequences in terms of 
cumulative disadvantage. As persistent poverty affects disproportionately families with 
children and adolescents, the issue should be a matter of priority concern in social policy 
agenda. Poverty and deprivation of youngsters’ corresponds not only to present experience of 
hardship but also has a lasting effect in their capabilities and future life opportunities. 
One has to point out that the most important programme in the solidarity subsystem of social 
security, the guaranteed minimum income scheme, was only fully introduced in July of 1997 
and the data presented above are unable to capture its effect. By 2001, the guaranteed 
minimum income scheme had benefited 725 thousand persons (7.5% of the population) and 
354 thousand persons (3.6% of the population) were then current beneficiaries. The total 
expenditure on minimum income benefits reached its maximum in 2000, amounting 284 
million euros (0.25% of GDP), and accounted for 235 million euros (0.19% of GDP) in 2001 
(Matsaganis et al, 2003). 
Rodrigues (2004) used 2000 Household Budget Survey to simulate the application of the 
programme and to estimate its effects in inequality and poverty. Comparing simulation results 
with official data, he estimated a take-up rate of 72%. D ue to the combination of two facts, 
that the minimum value of resources which the programme aims to supplement/complete is 
lower than the estimated poverty line and that the income considered in the process of 
determining the actual benefit is not the full household‘s income
11, the estimated impact in 
reducing the incidence of poverty is only 1.6%. However, the estimated effects in reducing 
                                                 
10 The analysis does not adopt the standard Eurostat definitions on equivalence scales (it uses OECD original 
equivalence scale) and poverty threshold (defined as 50% of the median equivalised income) but its results are 
consistent with the ones produce by other studies. 
 
11 Individual factors for the determination of the minimum value of resources for each household are also higher 
than scale equivalence factors used in poverty analysis (OECD modified scale).   17
intensity and severity FGT indices are of much more broad scope: 17.7% and 36%, 
respectively. 
Since 1995, Portugal introduced a new generation of social policies aiming to activate 
individuals back to labour market with accrued competences, as well as to forge in individuals 
and institutions a new culture of citizenship rights. Despite the positive and innovative 
developments, Portuguese safety nets are still rather ‘frail’ and many persons and families 
descend into poverty (Matsaganis et al, 2003) because they are not aware of their entitlements 
or fail to fulfill social benefits conditions (long-term unemployed, new entrants in labour 
market, informal economy workers, immigrant workers and families, ethnic minority families, 
isolated rural families) or because the inadequate amount of support received (social pensions, 
family allowances, disability or dependency supplements). 
Further, political support and legitimacy to a broader scope in social policy and its universal 
rights foundations are not definitively acquired in Portuguese society, as shown by the policy 
inflexions introduced by the new centre-right government that came into power in 2002. 
Poverty inertia in Portugal can be associated more generally with social and income 
dynamics. In a recent paper Ferreira (forthcoming) assesses income and poverty dynamics in 
Portugal over the period 1994-1997 using ECHP data
12. The study reveals a declining income 
mobility in the period under analysis, measured by several mobility indicators based on 
transition matrices and a strong level of inertia in the extreme deciles of the income 
distribution. Due to the combined evolution of entry and exit poverty rates, there is also a 
decrease in poverty turnover with a sharp increase in the probability of staying poor after 
having experienced more than one year in poverty. Persistent poverty amount to near 40% of 
cross-section poverty rate and chronic poverty amounts to near 50% of total panel poverty 
(ever poor). The high levels of persistent poverty are one of the facets of a highly segmented 
society with a relatively low degree of social mobility
13. 
Income and social inequalities in Portugal also seem to be reinforced by welfare provision 
stemming by informal relationships and particularly by family support (Wall et al, 2001). In 
fact, based on the 1999 national survey on Structure, Dynamics and Social Networks of 
Families with Children, W all et al (2001) found that a high proportion of families wishes for, 
and obtains, systematic transfers of resources between relatives (‘familialism’), although this 
                                                 
12 The adopted methodology is the same as Ferreira (2002). See footnote 10. 
13 Ras et al (2002) found that Portugal as the highest inertia of income distribution, and that income mobility is 
of a shorter range, in EU 15 in the same period.   18
appear to be strongly and systematically related with social factors such as socio-educational 
and income positions. More diversified, sustained and higher volume of support is to be found 
in the wealthier classes and there is evidence not only of day-to-day support but also 
intergeneration transmission of wealth. Thus, in line with other family studies in Portugal, the 
authors conclude that there are clear imbalances in informal support networks, which suggests 
“not a welfare situation but a system that reproduces social inequalities and asymmetries” 
(Wall et al, 2001: 222). 
Therefore, rather t han compensating for inadequate public provision in promoting social 
welfare, the idea of the existence of a strong welfare society in the southern Europe, or at least 
in Portugal, has to be reinterpreted carefully in its equity implications. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The paper tried to assess the extent to which social policies address chronic poverty in south 
European Union countries. The Southern European regime type was retained because it 
seemed to be more convenient to lay a theoretical background where political and institutional 
factors would play a determinant role in explaining high levels of poverty and social 
protection inefficiencies. As Arts and Gelissen (2002) point out, welfare typologies are to be 
preferred if they can lead to a more satisfying and empirical fruitful comparative analysis; the 
more relevant question is not just about what different configurations of welfare regimes 
emerge, but also why. 
In Southern European countries’ levels of social expenditure are relatively lower; there are 
significant differences between the pension system and other benefits; there are generous 
benefits associated with work positions and fragmented and frail minimum protection safety 
nets; social benefits other than pensions are relative scarce, not well targeted and present low 
level of efficiency i n reducing poverty; social benefits management system is open to some 
particularism and discritionarities which translates into a clientelist model that leads to 
inequities; consequently, levels of poverty incidence, intensity and persistence are relatively 
high; and even if there is social support to welfare state values, there is a remarkable social 
and political inertia about inequality and poverty. 
The Southern European regime also shares a special interplay of state institutions ’softness’ 
and the strong presence of family in the welfare mix. However, the importance of family as 
welfare provider is not only putting a tremendous weight in women’s ability to cope with   19
multiple family and economic roles (Matsaganis et al,  2003; Trifiletti, 1999) as well as could 
prove to be a system of social inequalities reproduction (Wall et al, 2001). 
New developments in social policy were introduced in south European countries in the late 
1990’s, especially through centre-left governments (Guillen and Matsaganis, 2000; 
Matsaganis et al, 2003), whose social impact are not yet take into full  account in most of the 
data presented. In consequence of new political ideas, there has been a clear social policy 
agenda update with increase and restructuring of social expenditure in Southern Europe. 
Programmes of income support and activation, such as minimum income schemes, were 
introduced in several Spanish regions during the 1990s, nationwide in Portugal in 1997, and 
in Italy in 2000. Only Greece as not yet implemented a social security programme of the kind 
(Matsaganis et al, 2003).  
However, facing socioeconomic specific characteristics (extended households, large shadow 
economies, high rates of self-employment, labour market segmentation, low a dministrative 
capacity, clientelist tensions and generalized tax evasion) and times of economic slowdown 
and restructuring, the construction of social safety nets and a more effective and fair social 
security system in Southern Europe can not simply rest i n the transfer of more developed 
systems of social assistance of Northern Europe (Matsaganis et al, 2003). In Southern Europe, 
as elsewhere, policy-makers need to search for original and better-fitted solutions, b ecause 
politics is neither an ahistorical nor acultural process.  
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